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October 30, 2002

Ms. Julie McLemore Director, Bureau of Regulatory Services Department of Agriculture and Commerce PO Box 1609 Jackson, Mississippi 39215

Re: Proposed Regulation To Support "Country of Origin Meat Labeling Law"

Dear Ms. McLemore,

Following up on your October 1, 2002, memorandum addressed to "All Retail Food Establishments," the purpose of this letter is to offer comments from the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) and the Retail Association of Mississippi (RAM) on the regulation proposed by the Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce to implement Senate Bill 2367, also known as the Country of Origin Meat Labeling Law (hereinafter "S.B. 2367"). As discussed more fully below, FMI objects to the proposed regulation on the grounds that, among other things, it is an unconstitutional exercise of power in violation of several provisions of the United States Constitution, including the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8; the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Section 2; the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In this regard, please see the enclosed letter from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), in which the Agency concludes that a substantially similar Louisiana statute and regulations are preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), essentially agreeing that the Louisiana law violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, we respectfully request that the Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce (the Department) withdraw the proposed regulation.

FMI conducts programs in research, education, industry relations and public affairs on behalf of its 2,300 member companies — food retailers and wholesalers — in the United States and around the world. FMI's U.S. members operate approximately 26,000 retail food stores with a combined annual sales volume of \$340 billion — three-quarters of all food retail store sales in the United States. FMI's retail membership is composed of large multi-store chains, regional firms and independent supermarkets. Its international membership includes 200 companies from 60 countries. The Retail Association of Mississippi represents a broad cross-section of retail stores that conduct business in the state of Mississippi.

#### I. Mississippi Country of Origin Meat Labeling Regulation

Senate Bill 2367, which was signed by the Mississippi governor, enacted a new provision to the state statutes to require unprocessed meat – whether fresh or frozen – to be labeled with information concerning the meat's country of origin "to the extent allowed by the Federal Meat Inspection Act and applicable federal meat inspection regulations." In particular, labeling on meat offered for sale in Mississippi must bear either (1) the name of the country of origin preceded by the words "Product of" or (2) one of the following designations that are specified in the statute: "Imported," "American," or "Blend" of imported and American meats. The statement must appear on the immediate wrapping or container of the meat unless the meat is displayed unwrapped, in which case the statement may appear on a sign included with the display. Prepared meat products sold for consumption on the premises and "fully cooked meat as defined by the U.S. Department of Agriculture" are specifically exempted from the scope of the law.

Each violation of the statute is punishable by civil penalties of up to \$500.00; each day on which a violation occurs is considered a separate offense under the statute.<sup>4</sup> The Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce is charged with the administration and enforcement of the Act and directed to adopt the rules and regulations necessary for the Department to carry out the Act.<sup>5</sup>

Toward this end, on October 1, 2002, the Department issued a memorandum addressed to "All Retail Food Establishments" with a proposed regulation interpreting the law and authorizing comments to be submitted until October 30, 2002. The proposed

<sup>3</sup> Id. at Sec. 1(4).

S.B. 2367, Sec. 1(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Id.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Id. at Sec. 1(2).

<sup>5</sup> Id. at Sec. 1(3).

Although this notice was apparently posted on the Department's website and mailed to the corporate headquarters of some companies doing business in Mississippi, we are aware of no other form of notice given to the public. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution necessitates the provision of adequate notice of regulatory proceedings to afford the public an opportunity to participate in rulemaking, which may substantially alter their constitutionally protected interests.

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regulation broadly defines meat as "the edible parts of the carcass of mammals and their organs and glands." The proposal states that labels on meat products may declare the product to be of U.S. origin only if the animal was exclusively born, raised and slaughtered in the U.S. Product that is blended of imported meat and American meat must be labeled as "Blend of American and imported meat from 'the country where produced." The proposed regulations allow a retailer that "sells only American meat" to display a single sign stating that fact, such as "only American meat sold here." <sup>10</sup>

The draft regulations provide some flexibility with respect to the labeling that appears to exceed the scope of the underlying statute. Specifically, COL Proposed Section 3(a) allows the country of origin labeling information to be provided by means of a label, stamp, mark, placard or other clear and visible sign on the "covered commodity" or on the package, display, holding unit, or bin containing the commodity at the final point of sale. Nonetheless, if a placard or sign is used, the proposed regulations require the sign to be at least 8.5" x 14", with a minimum of 1" lettering. 13

COL Proposed Sec. 3(b) also provides that the retailer is not required to provide any additional information on any "covered commodity" that is already individually labeled for retail sale regarding country of origin in a manner that complies with COL Proposed Sec. 2.<sup>14</sup>

Neither the memorandum nor the draft regulations indicate the proposed codification of the regulation; accordingly, for purposes of this comment, the proposed regulations will be cited as "COL Proposal."

COL Proposal, Sec. 1(a).

<sup>8</sup> COL Proposal, Sec. 2(b).

COL Proposal, Sec. 2(c).

<sup>10</sup> COL Proposal, Sec. 4.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Covered commodity" is not a term of art used either in the Mississippi statute or draft regulations. This provision appears to be taken directly from Section 10861 of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-171) (the Farm Bill), which amended the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 to establish a retail country of origin labeling program for "covered commodities," including meat, perishable agricultural commodities, seafood, and peanuts.

In contrast, the statute appears to delineate the appropriate method of labeling according to whether the meat is wrapped or unwrapped at the time that it is displayed to the public. See S.B. 2367 at Sec. 1(1). The language of the proposed regulation is apparently derived from Section 10816 of the Farm Bill.

<sup>13</sup> COL Proposal, Sec. 4.

This, too, appears to be derived from Section 10816 of the Farm Bill.

## II. Mississippi Country of Origin Meat Labeling Regulation Violates Supremacy Clause of U.S. Constitution

Article VI, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that, "the Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Under the so-called Supremacy Clause, laws or regulations that conflict with federal law are without effect. As discussed more fully below, Mississippi's country of origin meat labeling regulations and the underlying statute are preempted by Federal law, both expressly and by implication.

# A. FMIA Expressly Preempts Mississippi Country of Origin Meat Labeling Regulation

The Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) contains an express preemption provision regarding product labeling. In relevant part, the provision states as follows: "Marking, *labeling*, packaging or ingredient requirements . . . *in addition to, or different than*, those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State . . ."<sup>17</sup> "Labeling" is defined under the FMIA as "all labels and other written, printed or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article."<sup>18</sup>

As the federal statute prohibits states from imposing any labeling requirements that differ from or add to the federal requirements, the clause preempts even those state regulations that are more stringent than the FMIA. Accordingly, courts have found state labeling requirements to be preempted not only when they directly conflict with the federal labeling requirement, making it impossible to comply with both, but also in circumstances in which a state attempts to enact a requirement that has no counterpart under federal law.<sup>19</sup>

The Mississippi country of origin meat labeling regulations would require retailers either to label meat products or to post a sign accompanying the products declaring the products' country of origin or whether the products were produced in the United States, a "foreign country," or both. The FMIA does not require country of origin

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> *Maryland v. Louisiana*, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> 21 U.S.C. § 678 (emphasis added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> 21 U.S.C. § 601(p).

Anthony J. Pizza Food Products Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Agriculture, 676 F.2d 701 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1982) (unpublished opinion adopting district court opinion); National Broiler Council v. Voss, 44 F. 3d 740 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994); Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F. 2d 76 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1972), cert. den'd, 411 U.S. 981 (1973); Grocery Manufacturers of America v. Gerace, 581 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 755 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1985).

labeling. As the Mississippi law would impose labeling that is in addition to and different than the federal FMIA labeling requirements, the Mississippi requirements are expressly preempted by federal law.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, the fact that the Mississippi statute acknowledges the preemptive nature of the FMIA at the outset by stating that the requirements only apply to the extent that they are "allowed by the FMIA and applicable meat inspection regulations" cannot save the Mississippi provisions from preemption. Whether or not the Mississippi statute recognizes the preemptive power of the federal statute is irrelevant; if the Supremacy Clause applies, the state statute will be preempted, even if it is silent in this regard. And, as the labeling requirements are preempted in their entirety, none of the statute is "allowed by the FMIA."

## B. Labeling Required under Country of Origin Meat Labeling Regulation Is Preempted by Implication

The Mississippi country of origin meat labeling regulation is also preempted by implication because the Mississippi rule conflicts with federal law in several important respects. First, the FMIA prohibits the sale, transport, offer for sale or transportation, or receipt for transportation in commerce of any meat products that are misbranded at the time of such sale, transportation, offer for sale or transportation, or receipt for transportation. A product will be considered "misbranded" if its labeling is false or misleading in any particular. 22

The country of origin labeling that would be required under Mississippi law implies that the imported meat products are of lesser quality or present some health risk. One court noted that country of origin labeling can be designed to make a consumer "feel that the product was something to be shunned, as a matter either of stimulated reaction against it from its labeling, or of uncertainty as to what might be the implications thereof." Although domestic product will also be subject to labeling, it may be accomplished by a placard or with the more familiar sounding "American" or "Product of USA;" in contrast, the "imported" labeling may raise consumer concerns regarding the safety of the product.

Note, too, that the recent passage of the country of origin labeling program in Section 10816 of the Farm Bill does not save the Mississippi law from constitutional infirmity. First, the FMIA prevents states from imposing any labeling that is in addition to or different than those required by the FMIA, but does not prohibit the U.S. Congress from enacting additional labeling requirements. Second, the Farm Bill in conjunction with the FMIA evidence a comprehensive labeling scheme for country of origin labeling declarations with respect to meat to the extent that the federal government occupies the field and impliedly preempts any further state governmental activity in this arena. (See discussion below)

<sup>21</sup> U.S.C. § 610(c).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> 21 U.S.C. § 601(n)(1).

<sup>23</sup> *Armour*, 270 F. Supp. at 945-46.

However, as imported meat products are required to meet the same standards as domestically produced products,<sup>24</sup> the inherent implication of country of origin labeling that imported meat may be adulterated or unsafe is false and misleading. To require false and misleading labeling clearly conflicts with the federal laws' prohibition against misbranded products and, therefore, the Mississippi country of origin meat labeling regulation is preempted by the federal laws by implication.

The recent passage of Section 10816 of the Farm Bill provides a second basis for the implied preemption of the Mississippi law. Specifically, state law is preempted if Congress legislates comprehensively, that is, occupies an entire field of regulation evidencing an intent to leave no room for the states to supplement federal law. When determining whether Congress intended to occupy the field, or whether a state law conflicts with federal law, courts consider the relationship between state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written.

In this case, Section 10816 of the Farm Bill, as supplemented by the country of origin labeling guidelines USDA recently published, sets forth a comprehensive scheme for country of origin labeling for an extremely broad range of products, including meat. The comprehensive regulatory system, which became effective upon the recent passage of the Farm Bill, includes the development of federal guidelines, a period during which the program can be implemented without penalties, and, ultimately, a system of mandatory country of origin labeling. Accordingly, the Farm Bill evidences Congressional intent to occupy the field of country of origin meat labeling regulation, thereby impliedly preempting state laws of this nature, including the Mississippi Country of Origin Meat Labeling Law.

### II. Country of Origin Meat Labeling Regulation Violates Commerce Clause of U.S. Constitution

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution enumerates the powers expressly delegated to Congress. In relevant part, the Commerce Clause of Section 8 provides that "the Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . ." In addition to the direct grant of authority to Congress, the Commerce Clause has long been recognized to limit the power of states to erect barriers to trade. Thus, under the so-called "dormant Commerce Clause," states are prohibited from imposing regulatory measures that are designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening foreign or out-of-state competitors. <sup>27</sup>

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 326 (1979); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S.
525 (1949); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1873).

See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd., v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).

See 21 U.S.C. § 620(a).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> U.S. Const., art. I, § 8.

The Supreme Court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach to analyzing state economic regulation under the Commerce Clause. When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, the Court has generally struck down the statute without further inquiry. When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, the Court has examined whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits. There is, however, "no clear line" separating the categories of state regulation that are virtually *per se* invalid under the Commerce Clause and those that are subject to the balancing approach set forth in *Pike v. Bruce Church*; rather the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity. In this case, regardless of the test that is applied, the Mississippi statute does not pass constitutional muster.

### A. Mississippi Law Discriminates Against Non-Domestically Produced Meat Products

As discussed more fully above, the Mississippi statute and regulations require meat to be labeled with either a statement of the product's country of origin or a statement that the product is one of the following: "American," "Imported," or "Blend of Imported and American Meats." Although labeling is required for domestically produced meats as well as imported products, the type of labeling required inherently discriminates against meats produced in countries other than the United States.

Specifically, domestically produced meats must be labeled in one of two ways, both of which identify the specific country of origin, namely, "Product of the USA" or "American." In contrast, meats produced in countries other than the United States may either be identified as "Product of [specific country]" or with a generic "Imported" designation. The fact that meats produced in countries other than the United States may be identified with only a generic statement of their non-domestic origin while domestic products must be identified as "Product of the USA" or "American" evidences an intent to discriminate against foreign commerce.

Moreover, the regulations favor domestic products by providing retailers with a regulatory incentive not to offer imported meats to customers. Specifically, the regulations allow retailers who offer only domestically produced meats to avoid the regulation's on-pack label requirement and post a placard averring that the establishment sells only American meat. 33 Although the placard requirement is itself an

<sup>30</sup> Id. at 579, citing *Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.*, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).

Brown-Forman Distillers v. NY Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Id. at 579

<sup>31</sup> *Brown-Forman*, 476 US at 579.

<sup>32</sup> COL Proposal, Sec. 2.

<sup>33</sup> COL Proposal, Sec. 4.

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unconstitutional burden on commerce (see discussion below), the fact that the Department has chosen to offer this slightly less burdensome alternative to retailers who have "purged" their stores of imported meats and only offer "American" products is further evidence of the discriminatory intent underlying the regulations.

# B. Mississippi Lacks Legitimate Interest in Country of Origin Labeling Regulations

For a state law or regulation that impacts interstate or foreign commerce to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the state must have and must have articulated a legitimate interest in enacting the restriction. For example, a state generally has the authority to implement non-discriminatory legislation to protect the health, safety or welfare of its citizens, provided that the burden on interstate or foreign commerce does not clearly exceed the local benefits.<sup>34</sup> In this case, however, Mississippi has not expressed the basis for its interest in the state statute or regulations. We were unable to locate any legislative history on the underlying statute and the draft regulations were not accompanied by a preamble that in any way explained the state's interest in the country of origin meat labeling regulations.

In the absence of an expressly declared interest, the state cannot be presumed to have a legitimate interest. Indeed, the state's true motive for enacting country of origin meat labeling legislation and promulgating the accompanying regulations is likely to be economic protectionism.

#### C. Country of Origin Meat Labeling Regulation Unduly Burdens Interstate Commerce

In addition to the foregoing, courts generally consider the impact of the state restriction on interstate or foreign commerce when conducting an inquiry under the Commerce Clause. In this case, the Mississippi statute and accompanying regulations would place significant costs and administrative burdens on retailers and wholesalers that would, in turn, place an undue burden on interstate and foreign commerce.

Specifically, once meat from abroad enters the United States, it enters the same distribution channels as domestic products. Separating fresh cuts of meat based on their country of origin will be difficult to do and will impose substantial recordkeeping and other administrative costs on retailers and wholesalers. Retailers and wholesalers will incur further costs to achieve compliance with the regulations, including the costs of training personnel in the necessary compliance measures, and the costs of labels and the labor necessary to apply them.

<sup>34</sup> 

Moreover, the burdens of the labeling requirements will not be materially alleviated by the provision that a placard may be used in lieu of labels for retailers that sell only domestically-produced meat. This alternative would not obviate the burden of tracing or determining the origin of meats.<sup>35</sup>

The burden will be felt in foreign commerce as well, as foreign suppliers will be required to utilize resources and adopt measures that will serve no other purpose but to satisfy the discriminatory Mississippi law. Accordingly, the regulations are intended to and will burden foreign commerce.

#### D. Less Restrictive Measures Available

In reviewing state action to determine whether or not it is permissible under the Commerce Clause, a reviewing court looks to see whether the state government used the least restrictive means possible to achieve a legitimate interest. In this case, as no legitimate interest was articulated, it is unnecessary to consider whether any less restrictive measures are available.

### IV. Country of Origin Meat Labeling Regulation Violates Free Speech Clause of U.S. Constitution

The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." The First Amendment limits the government's ability to compel speech, as well as the government's ability to restrict speech. The Mississippi law and accompanying regulations attempt to compel speech in an unlawful violation of the First Amendment.

The appropriate standard for determining whether a governmental compulsion of speech is unlawful is set forth in *Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission*. <sup>38</sup> In order for compelled speech to meet the test set forth in *Central Hudson*, the government must assert a substantial interest in support of the compelled speech and the required speech must be narrowly tailored to advance the asserted substantial interest directly.

As discussed more fully above, Mississippi has not articulated a legitimate interest in requiring country of origin labeling; therefore, the state lacks a compelling interest in country of origin labeling regulations. Moreover, Mississippi has not demonstrated that the speech that would be compelled under the regulation would advance the government's interest. As states must supply empirical evidence of direct

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> See *Tupman Thurlow Co. v. Moss*, 252 F. Supp. 641, 646 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).

U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 2.

International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).

<sup>38</sup> Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

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advancement of the interest by the compelled speech, Mississippi has not met its burden in this regard, either.

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For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully urge the Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce (1) to withdraw the proposed country of origin meat labeling regulations and (2) to forego the promulgation of final country of origin meat labeling regulations.

Sincerely,

Deborah R. White Regulatory Counsel

Enclosure